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Limits to terror speech in the UK and USA: 
balancing freedom of expression with national security 
 
Ian Turner` 
 
Abstract 
 
Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), freedom of expression, is 
incorporated into UK law. With the growing Islamist terror threat after 9/11, particularly 
threatening European security, the Council of Europe introduced the Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism (CPT), 2005. One of the Articles within the Convention, Article 5, 
obliges states to outlaw ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’. Drawing on its 
obligations in the CPT, the UK enacted s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006: ‘encouragement of 
terrorism’. But in implementing its duties, the UK went further. There are very real concerns, 
therefore, about the effects of this legislation on freedom of expression. The test for 
interpreting breaches of Article 10 is ‘proportionality’. Comparatively, in America there is a 
much stronger test than proportionality, ‘strict scrutiny’, in assessing limits to terror speech. 
But in the age of Islamism, together with the speed, ease and little cost incurred in sharing 
terror speech online, should there not be a reappraisal of American law? The author is based 
in the UK. But the UK’s approach to limiting terror speech is arguably too intrusive of freedom 
of expression. This paper, therefore, proposes a compromise approach between the two 
jurisdictions. 
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Introduction 
 
As per the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
is incorporated into UK law. One of these rights is Article 10(1), freedom of expression. This 
protects speech that either offends, shocks or disturbs, as per the case of Handyside v. United 
Kingdom1 at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Following its obligations in Article 
5 of the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CPT), 2005, public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence, the UK enacted the Terrorism Act 2006, to disrupt 
Islamists, for example, from exploiting the internet for terrorist purposes. Section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 outlaws the encouragement of terrorism. Firstly, there is no need to show 
a danger that such an offence may be committed, only that it is likely to be understood by 
some members of the public as an encouragement of terrorism; secondly, in addition to 
including the intentional encouragement of terrorism, the offence can be committed 
recklessly. There are very real concerns, therefore, about the effects of this legislation on 
freedom of expression, especially as they seemingly exceed the UK’s obligations in the CPT. If 
a person distributes, sells, gives, shares etc the encouragement of terrorism, they are 
committing an offence contrary to s.2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, the ‘dissemination of 
terrorist publications’. Following the beheading of US journalist, James Foley, in 2014, for 
example, videos of which were posted on YouTube, the British police reminded people not to 
share the pictures in case of incurring criminal prosecution under s.2.2 
 
The test for interpreting breaches of Article 10(1) of the ECHR is ‘proportionality’, as per 
Handyside,3 that is, whether the limitation on expression is in proportion to the objective of 
the state, such as protection of national security, prevention of disorder and crime etc. Where 
the infringement of Article 10(1) is attributed to terror speech, the courts interpret the 
proportionality test much more in favour of the state at the expense of the individual, as per 
                                                          
1 Application no. 5493/72, para 49. 
2 Josh Halliday, ‘Police warn sharing James Foley killing video is a crime’ The Guardian 20 
August 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/20/police-warn-james-
foley-video-crime-social-media> accessed 4 March 2019. 
3 ibid para 49. 
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Leroy v. France.4 So there is almost a double deference shown by the courts to the interests 
of the state: the test employed, as well as the context in which it is applied. 
 
Comparatively, in the United States, for example, there is a much stronger test than 
proportionality in assessing content-based interferences with the First Amendment of the 
Constitution, free speech: ‘strict scrutiny’. This follows, for example, the ruling of the United 
States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) in Brandenburg v. Ohio.5 But in the age of Islamist terrorism 
post 9/11, particularly with the speed, ease and little cost incurred in sharing terror speech 
online, is the Brandenburg test of ‘strict scrutiny’ too much in favour of the individual at the 
expense of the state? America is clearly not subject to European human rights law, but in 
curtailing speech, especially that of a terrorist nature, rights within the ECHR, especially those 
that directly respect the rights and freedoms of others, deserve serious consideration. The 
author is based in the UK. But the UK’s approach to limiting terror speech is arguably too 
intrusive of freedom of expression. This paper, therefore, proposes a compromise approach 
between the two jurisdictions.  
 
Security threats, and terror speech in particular 
 
Europol, the Europe Union’s (EU) law enforcement agency, said that a record number of 
terrorist attacks – 211 – had been planned, foiled or carried out in EU countries in 2015, the 
highest since records began in 2006. All of them occurring in just six member states: Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK.6 Indeed, the Global Terrorism Index 2018 reports that 
the number of terrorist incidents in Europe increased to 282 in 2017, which itself was an 
increase from 2016, when it was 253.7 In the author’s own country, the UK, 23 people died, 
                                                          
4 Application number 36109/03. 
5 395 US 444 (1969). 
6 BBC News, ‘Record Number of EU Terror Attacks Recorded in 2015’ 20 July 2016 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36845647> accessed 28 February 2017. 
7 Institute for Economics and Peace, The Global Terrorism Index 2018. November 2018 
<http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf> 
accessed 18 February 2019, 2. But in 2018, in Europe, the number of deaths from terrorism 
fell to 62 – see, for example: Institute for Economics and Peace, The Global Terrorism Index 
2019, November 2019 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-
2019web.pdf> accessed 13 December 2019, 2. 
4 
 
and 250 people were injured, in 2017, in Manchester, when a suicide bomber detonated a 
suicide best at an Ariane Grande concert. And at about the same time there were two terror 
incidents in London, primarily on London and Westminster Bridges, killing a further 12 people. 
In addition, a bomb was left on a tube train at Parsons Green, west London, in September, 
but failed to fully explode. A further nine terrorist attacks, in 2017, were prevented.8 In 
December 2018, it was reported that the UK authorities were investigating about 700 ‘live’ 
counter-terrorism cases.9 The head of MI6, Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, has recently 
said that the scale of the terrorism threat facing the UK is ‘unprecedented’.10 The UK’s terror 
threat level is currently at ‘severe’, meaning an attack is highly likely. Twice in 2017 it was 
raised to its maximum level, ‘critical’, meaning an attack was imminent, after the Manchester 
and Parsons Green attacks.  
 
The ‘severe’ terror threat to the UK, for example, does not simply come from those who 
commit, or even prepare, attacks: there are those who ether encourage or instigate them via 
the world wide web.11 The internet is the perfect platform for terrorists: it is inexpensive, fast, 
instantaneous, anonymous and, unlike the traditional print media, permits those intent on 
hate to control the narrative. It allows for the limitless collection and sharing of terrorist 
propaganda, across multiple devices, such as home computers and mobile devices. Terrorists 
can indoctrinate, radicalise, recruit and train new members within closed communities and/or 
chat rooms, through the media of sermons, instructional videos, blogs, social media, such as 
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Snapchat, and interactive websites. It also 
                                                          
 
8 Chris Johnston, ‘Two Detained Under Terrorism Act as UK Arrests Reach Record High’ The 
Guardian 29 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/29/two-
detained-under-terrorism-act-as-uk-arrests-reach-record-high> accessed 19 December 2017. 
9 Vikram Dodd and Josh Halliday, ‘Police Thwart Possible Isis-inspired Plot After Newcastle 
Arrest’ The Guardian 11 December 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2018/dec/11/armed-police-in-newcastle-arrest-man-for-alleged-terrorism-
offences?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Tweet> accessed 18 February 2019. 
10 BBC News, ‘Terrorism Most Immediate Threat to UK, says MI6’ 8 December 2016 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38250432> accessed 28 February 2017. 
11 See, for example: Martin Rudner, ‘“Electronic Jihad”: The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst 
for Global Terror’ (2017) 40 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 10-23. 
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affords terrorists the valuable opportunity to raise funds.12 The transnational nature of the 
web permits terror speech, which has been shut down in one country, to simply find a host in 
another.13 
 
In the UK, for instance, the leader of the extremist group, al-Muhajiroun, Anjem Choudary, 
was convicted of supporting Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in July 2016. He was 
convicted after jurors heard he had sworn an oath of allegiance to ISIL. He had also urged 
followers to support ISIL in a series of broadcasts on YouTube: supporters were told to 
obey Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ISIL leader, and travel to Syria.14  Choudary is reported to have 
influenced at least 100 British jihadis.15 But with free speech concerns social media platforms 
were reluctant to remove Choudary’s online posts, even after he was arrested for inviting 
support for ISIL. British authorities allegedly made repeated efforts to have his Twitter posts 
and YouTube videos removed. But they had no power to force corporations to remove 
material from the internet even if it had breached UK anti-terror laws. In August 2016, even 
after Choudary had been convicted, he had more than 32,000 followers on Twitter and his 
account could still be viewed online, despite requests for its removal in August 2015 and the 
following March.16 Maybe because of repeated criticism from foreign governments about the 
hosting of terror material on their platforms, in June 2017, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and 
YouTube formed the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). The objective of 
                                                          
12 For a general discussion of the internet as an ‘indispensable medium’ for terrorists, see, for 
example: Alexander Tsesis, ‘Terrorist Speech on Social Media’ (2017) 70(2) Vanderbilt Law 
Review 651-708, 655-662. 
13 Elizabeth Renieris, ‘Combating Incitement to Terrorism on the Internet: Comparative 
Approaches in the United States and United Kingdom and the Need for an International 
Solution’ (2009) 11 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 673-709, 676. 
14 Jamie Grierson, Vikram Dodd and Jason Rodrigues, ‘Anjem Choudary convicted of 
supporting Islamic State’ The Guardian 16 August 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/aug/16/anjem-choudary-convicted-of-supporting-islamic-state> accessed 28 
February 2019. 
15 Vikram Dodd and Jamie Grierson, ‘Revealed: How Anjem Choudary Influenced at Least 100 
British jihadis’ The Guardian 16 August 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/aug/16/revealed-how-anjem-choudary-inspired-at-least-100-british-jihadis > 
accessed 28 February 2019. 
16 Press Association, ‘Twitter and YouTube Would not Remove Anjem Choudary’s Posts, Court 
Told’ The Guardian 16 August 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/aug/16/twitter-youtube-anjem-choudary-
social-media> accessed 28 February 2019. 
6 
 
GIFCT is ‘to substantially disrupt terrorists’ ability to promote terrorism, disseminate violent 
extremist propaganda, and exploit or glorify real-world acts of violence using our platforms’.17 
GIFTCT claims, for example, that between July 2017 and December 2017, a total of 274,460 
Twitter accounts were permanently suspended for violations related to the promotion of 
terrorism. Of those suspensions, 93% consisted of accounts flagged by internal, proprietary 
spam-fighting tools, while 74% of those accounts were suspended before their first tweet.18 
In addition, 99% of ISIL and Al Qaeda-related terror content that is removed from Facebook 
is content that is detected before anyone in its community has flagged it, and in some cases, 
before it goes live on the site. Once Facebook is aware of a piece of terror content, it removes 
83% of subsequently uploaded copies within one hour of upload.19 However, later, in January 
2018, the then British Prime Minister, Theresa May, called on social media platforms to do 
more to combat terrorism.20 And more recently, in March 2019, there were multiple 
shootings by a Far Right terrorist, Brenton Tarrant, at two Mosques in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, killing 50 people, which Tarrant livestreamed for 17 minutes on Facebook.21 
Although the original footage was removed by Facebook after an hour, it was repeatedly re-
uploaded by other users.22 
 
The enduring influence of inciting terror violence online: the case of Anwar Al-Awlaki 
 
In 2010 the British domestic security services, MI5, feared that a new a new generation of 
British extremists were being radicalised online by Anwar al-Awlaki, who at the time was 
                                                          
17 Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, ‘About our Mission’ <https://gifct.org/about/> 
accessed 26 June 2019. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 Heather Stewart and Jessica Elgot, ‘May Calls on Social Media Giants to do More to Tackle 
Terrorism’ The Guardian 24 January 2018 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/24/theresa-may-calls-on-social-media-
giants-to-do-more-to-tackle-terrorism> accessed 28 February 2019. 
21 Twitter has also been used to live stream a terror attack – see, for example: David Mair, 
‘#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack’ (2017) 40 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24-43. 
22 Jim Waterson, ‘Facebook Removed 1.5m Videos of New Zealand Terror Attack in First 24 
hours’ The Guardian 17 March 2019 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/17/facebook-removed-15m-videos-new-
zealand-terror-attack> Accessed 18 March 2019. 
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regarded as one of the world’s most wanted terrorists. Al-Awlaki, who was born in America, 
but was of Yemeni descent, was in hiding in Yemen. He had become the foremost influence 
on young radical Muslims across the world through his English language sermons delivered 
over the internet. In the UK, for example, he developed a following among terrorists and 
terrorist groomers, including, in 2005, the 7th July and 21st July bombers in London. CDs of his 
sermons were found in the Iqra bookshop in Leeds — where the bombers had held meetings 
— when it was raided. In 2009 a UK government analysis of YouTube found that al-Awlaki had 
1,910 videos on the site, one of which had been viewed 164,420 times.23 Moreover, in 2010, 
Roshonara Choudhry, a 21-year-old student, was jailed for life for trying to murder the Labour 
Member of Parliament (MP) Stephen Timms because he had voted for the war in Iraq. 
Choudhry stabbed the MP twice in the stomach at a constituency surgery in east London. The 
student had become radicalised having watched online sermons by al-Awlaki.24 
 
Anwar al-Awlaki had a significant influence beyond the UK, because of the reach of the 
internet. Major Nidal Hasan, for example, who had killed 13 people at the Fort Hood military 
base in Texas in 2009, had asked for al-Awlaki’s advice in emails about a suicide attack.25  After 
the attack al-Awlaki bragged that Hasan was his student and defended the murder spree as 
‘a heroic act’ and ‘a wonderful operation’.26 Also, in 2009, following the influence of al-Awlaki, 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, was recruited by Al Qaeda to blow up an American 
airliner approaching Detroit, but the bomb did not explode. Abdulmutallab told FBI agents 
that, with guidance from al-Awlaki, he had ‘worked through all [the] issues’.27  Anwar al-
                                                          
23 Duncan Gardham and Con Coughlin, ‘Anwar al-Awlaki: MI5 Warns of the al-Qaeda Preacher 
Targeting Britain’ The Telegraph 11 June 2010 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7822761/Anwar-al-
Awlaki-MI5-warns-of-the-al-Qaeda-preacher-targeting-Britain.html> accessed 28 February 
2019. 
24 BBC News, ‘Woman Jailed for Life for Attack on MP Stephen Timms’ 3 November 2010 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11682732  > accessed 28 February 2019. 
25 Billy Kenbar, ‘Nidal Hasan Convicted of Fort Hood killings’ The Washington Post 23 August 
2013 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nidal-hasan-convicted-of-
fort-hood-killings/2013/08/23/39c468c8-0c03-11e3-9941-
6711ed662e71_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5a7df7ad8d23> accessed 28 
February 2019. 
26 Tsesis (n 12) 660. 
27  Scott Shane, ‘Inside Al Qaeda’s Plot to Blow Up an American Airliner’ The New York Times 
22nd February 2017  <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/anwar-awlaki-
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Awlaki was eventually killed by an American drone strike in Yemen in 2011.28 But the influence 
he exerted, even after death, remains. For example, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was responsible 
for the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, was a self-radicalized jihadist. His audio collection 
included speeches and videos of al-Awlaki.29  Indeed, America’s worst domestic shooting, the 
killing of 49 people and the wounding of 53 others at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, in 2016, 
was committed by Omar Mateen, who had been influenced by watching videos of Al-Awlaki.30 
 
The significance of freedom of expression in the UK and USA 
 
The HRA incorporates the ECHR into UK law. One of these rights is Article 10(1), freedom of 
expression. As per the case of Handyside, the ECtHR said that, subject to Article 10(2), the 
right was applicable not only to information or ideas that were favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offended, shocked 
or disturbed the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there was no democratic society.31 The First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States protects free speech. Like Article 10(1) 
of the ECHR, it protects speech that is not favourably received. In Matal v. Tam,32 in SCOTUS, 
Justice Samuel Alito said:  
 
‘We have said time and again that the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers…If there 
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
                                                          
underwear-bomber-abdulmutallab.html> accessed 28 February 2019. 
28 Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage and Scott Shane ‘How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in 
America’s Cross Hairs’ The New York Times 9 March 2013 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-
americas-cross-hairs.html accessed 28 February 2019. 
29 Ann O’Neill, ‘The 13th Juror: The Radicalization of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’ Cable News Network 
30 March 2015 https://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/27/us/tsarnaev-13th-juror-jahar-
radicalization/index.html > accessed 18 March 2019. 
30 Scott Shane, ‘The Enduring Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State’ 
(2016) (9) Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel 15-19, 15. 
31 Application no. 5493/72, para 49. 
32 137 US 1744 (2017). 
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not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.’33 
 
The ECtHR in Handyside also said that the Court’s supervisory functions oblige it to pay the 
utmost attention to the principles characterising a ‘democratic society’. Freedom of 
expression constituted one of the essential foundations of such a society. Why is freedom of 
expression an essential foundation of a democratic society? A key argument is the idea of 
personal autonomy – the state should not determine what is/is not appropriate for an 
individual to view, hear, read etc. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,34 SCOTUS famously declared: 
‘It is a central tenet of [free speech] that the government must remain neutral in the 
marketplace of ideas.’35 Indeed, the ‘marketplace of ideas’ argument is another important 
consideration in the determination of the significance of freedom of expression. In Regina 
(Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport,36 for 
example, the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords (as it was then called) said:  
 
‘The fundamental rationale of the democratic process is that if competing views, 
opinions and policies are publicly debated and exposed to public scrutiny the good will 
over time drive out the bad and the true prevail over the false. It must be assumed 
that, given time, the public will make a sound choice when, in the course of the 
democratic process, it has the right to choose.’37 
 
The significance of free speech to countries like the UK and America is not only reliant on 
domestic law, but also international law: Articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both decry 
limitations on expression.  
  
 
                                                          
33 137 US 1744 (2017), 1763. 
34 438 US 726 (1978). 
35 ibid 745-746. 
36 [2008] UKHL 15. 
37 ibid para 28. 
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The qualification of freedom of expression in the UK and USA, especially terror speech 
 
Free speech is not unlimited. For example, Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, freedom of expression, 
is qualified by Article 19(3): ‘The exercise of the [right] carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such 
as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health 
or morals.’ Indeed, Article 20 of the ICCPR also states: (1) Any propaganda for war shall be 
prohibited by law (2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.’ Regionally, for 
the purposes of the UK, Article 10(1) of the ECHR, freedom of expression, is also qualified. In 
Erbakan v. Turkey,38 for example, the ECtHR said: ‘As a matter of principle it may be 
considered necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of 
expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance.’39 There is 
also an express duty to act responsibly within the right, as per Article 10(2) of the ECHR. 
Furthermore, the test for interpreting breaches of Article 10(1) is ‘proportionality’, that is, 
whether the limitation on expression is in proportion to the objective of the state, such as 
protection of national security, prevention of disorder and crime etc. For example, in the 
above case of Handyside, the applicant, a publisher, was charged and convicted under the 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 for ‘having in his possession obscene books entitled The Little 
Red Schoolbook for publication for gain’. Copies of the book, which were meant for children 
over 12 and included information on sex – abortion, homosexuality, intercourse and 
masturbation etc – were seized, forfeited and later destroyed. The court said that the 
infringement was in breach of Article 10(1) of the ECHR but was lawful, as per Article 10(2), 
since the interference was in proportion to the state’s aim of protecting health and morals.40 
 
Comparatively, there is a much stronger test than proportionality in America, ‘strict scrutiny’, 
in reviewing content-based limitations on free speech: see, for example, Adarand 
                                                          
38 Application no. 59405/00. 
39 ibid para 56. 
40 Application no. 5493/72, para 49. 
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Constructors, Inc v. Pena.41 Indeed, when ratifying the ICCPR, in 1992, the US filed reservations 
in respect to Articles 19 and 20 to afford its domestic law on free speech greater protection 
than the ICCPR seemingly allows. In the past, however, SCOTUS upheld the constitutionality 
of various statutes that significantly limited freedom of speech under the pressures of the 
World Wars, Schenck v. United States,42 and the perceived communist threat, Dennis v. United 
States.43 In Schenck, for example, two defendants were convicted under the Espionage Act of 
1917 of inducing conscripted personnel from joining the armed forces. The test then for 
violations of the First Amendment involved less exacting intensity of review than ‘strict 
scrutiny’: ‘The question in every case is whether the words used are in such circumstances 
and are of a such nature as to create a clear and present danger [my italics] that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.’44 
 
However, after WWII, SCOTUS began to take a tougher stance on the protection of free 
speech, even in cases of perceived speech inciting violence: Yates v. United States.45 This 
culminated in the ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio.46 In Brandenburg a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leader 
was filmed by a local television crew at a rally making racist remarks about returning Black 
people to Africa and Jews to Israel: ‘We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, 
our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s 
possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.’47 This was accompanied by 
KKK sympathisers holding firearms. Brandenburg’s original conviction for advocating violence 
was quashed. He court said: ‘The constitutional guarantees of free speech…do not permit a 
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
                                                          
41 515 US 200 (1995). 
42 249 US 47 (1919). 
43 341 US 494 (1951). See for example, David Barnum, ‘Indirect Incitement and Freedom of 
Speech in Anglo-American Law’ [2006] European Human Rights Law Review 258-280, 270-
274. 
44 249 US 47 (1919), 52. 
45 354 US 298 (1957). 
46 395 US 444 (1969). 
47 ibid 446. 
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produce such action.’48 (SCOTUS has since confirmed that regulation of the internet is 
afforded the same First Amendment protection as the print media: Reno v. ACLU.49)  
 
There are, therefore, three issues to prove for inciting terrorism in America, even if the hate 
speech is conducted online: 1) imminent harm 2) the likelihood of that imminent harm and 
the 3) the intention to directly cite others.50 This is a much narrower test than proportionality 
for assessing unlawful breaches of Article 10(1) of the ECHR. Thus, there is far more tolerance 
of hate speech in America than in the UK.51 For example, the Rock musician Ted Nugent drew 
fire for an online post in 2016 insinuating gun control in America was the product of a vast 
Jewish conspiracy. In a post on Facebook, he showed the faces of several American politicians 
next to Israeli flags beneath the caption: ‘So who is really behind gun control?’ In a later post 
he claimed: ‘Jews for gun control are Nazis in disguise’.52 According to Guiora, this is not an 
instance in which the American government could limit speech online: ‘As vile, anti-Semitic, 
or odious Mr Nugent’s posting may be, it need not be removed from social media.’53 Guiora 
also references Palestinian terrorist groups’ social media posting about running over Jews in 
cars in 2015. This, too, would be protected by the First Amendment: ‘This…is [very] general 
and [unclear] in its ‘how to’ instructions.’54 
 
Attempts to limit terror speech in the UK and USA 
 
With the growing Islamist terror threat after 9/11, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), in 2005, passed Resolution 1624 ‘condemning in the strongest terms the incitement 
                                                          
48 ibid 447. 
49 521 US 844 (1997). 
50 Tsesis (n 12) 655-667. 
51 SCOTUS is less tolerant of some forms of expression, however, such as child pornography, 
obscene speech, fraudulent utterances etc – see, for example: Zachary Price, ‘Our Imperiled 
Absolutist First Amendment’ (2018) 20 Journal of Constitutional Law 821-848, 827. 
52 Andrew Blake, ‘Ted Nugent Blames Jews for Gun Control in Facebook posts’ The 
Washington Times 9 February 2016 
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/9/ted-nugent-blames-jews-gun-
control-facebook-posts/> accessed 4 March 2019. 
53 Amos Guiora, ‘Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: The Limits of Tolerating Intolerance’ in 
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of terrorist acts and repudiating attempts at the justification or glorification (apologie) of 
terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts’. Thus, the resolution, in s.1, calls upon all 
states to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate to: (a) prohibit by law 
incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; (b) prevent such conduct; (c) and deny safe haven 
to any persons guilty of such conduct. (More recently, the UNSC has passed Resolution 2178 
(2014), in which it addresses the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. The UNSC cites effective 
implication of Resolution 1624 as an important factor in the effective implementation of 
Resolution 2178.55) Similarly, in the same year as Resolution 1624, in 2005, the CoE published 
the CPT. One of the Articles within the CPT, Article 5(1), obliges states to outlaw ‘public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence’. This means: ‘the distribution, or otherwise making 
available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist 
offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a 
danger that one or more such offences may be committed’. 
 
Drawing on its international and regional counter-terror obligations, as well as following the 
7/7 bombings in London in 2005, killing 52 people, the UK enacted the Terrorism Act 2006, to 
disrupt individuals from exploiting the internet for terrorist purposes. Section 1 introduced a 
new offence of ‘encouragement of terrorism’. Section 1(1) applies to a statement that is likely 
to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a 
direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Furthermore, the mental element of the 
offence, according to s.1(2), is –  a person publishes a statement; and at the time they publish 
it, they –  either (i) intend members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or (ii) 
are reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged. So 
the offence can be committed recklessly, as well as intentionally. For the purposes of indirectly 
encouraging terrorism, this includes every statement which—glorifies the commission or 
preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences, as per 
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s.1(3). Section 1(5) says that it is irrelevant (a) whether anything mentioned in those 
subsections relates to the commission, preparation or instigation of one or more particular 
acts of terrorism or of acts of terrorism generally; and, (b) whether any person is in fact 
encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate any such act or 
offence. As per s.17, the UK has universal jurisdiction to try encouragements of terrorism 
committed abroad and/or by foreign nationals. The ‘public’ for whom a statement can either 
intentionally or recklessly encourage terrorism can be outside the UK, as per s.20(3). 
Interestingly, in practice, the UK prosecuting authorities have confined the prosecution of the 
offence to countering international terror groups, meaning there have been no prosecutions 
against domestic terror groups, particularly in Northern Ireland: ‘The absence of any charges 
being laid for the offence of encouraging terrorism in Northern Ireland appears peculiar. The 
prevalence of paramilitary murals on walls in Northern Ireland falls well within the scope of 
the provisions of the Act, which criminalises statements—including images—which 
encourage or glorify terrorism.’56  
 
An example of a person convicted of an offence contrary to s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is 
Tareena Shakil, who glorified terrorism on social media. Shakil was radicalised on the internet 
and travelled to Syria via Turkey after telling friends and family she was off on a beach holiday. 
She spent more than two months living in a mansion and, while there, sent messages and 
pictures glorifying ISIL including ones of her posing with an AK-47 assault rifle.57 Although 
Shakil was British it was irrelevant, therefore, that her incitement occurred outside the UK.  
 
If a person distributes, sells, gives, shares etc the encouragement of terrorism they are 
committing an offence contrary to s.2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, the ‘dissemination of 
terrorist publications’. A person convicted of an offence contrary to s.2 is Mohammed Gul, 
who was sentenced to five years imprisonment for creating jihadi videos between 2008 and 
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2009 and sharing them online via YouTube.58 The prosecuting authorities in the UK may wish 
to regulate the promotion of terrorist propaganda online in other ways: for example, instead 
of charging someone with a terror offence, they may wish to prosecute someone contrary to 
s.1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Here a person sends either an indecent or 
grossly offensive electronic communication with the intention of causing distress or anxiety. 
(Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 is a similar offence.) This is what happened 
recently when a man in the UK allegedly supported the recent Far Right terror shootings in 
Christchurch on social media.59 
 
With the strict interpretation of the First Amendment by SCOTUS in Brandenburg, for 
example, an attempt to limit terror speech, particularly by mirroring the UK’s Terrorism Act 
2006, would be unconstitutional. Encouragement of terrorism in Britain does not require 
threats of imminent lawless action, for example.60 But America can limit the speech of 
terrorists in other ways, such as ‘true threats’. A true threat is a statement that is meant to 
frighten or intimidate one or more specified persons into believing that they will be seriously 
harmed by the speaker or by someone acting at the speaker’s behest.61 Reference to the harm 
and the First Amendment is the ruling of SCOTUS in Watts v. United States,62 which was the 
same year as Brandenburg, in 1969. At a very public, political forum – an anti-Vietnam War 
rally – the defendant allegedly said to a large crowd: ‘If they ever make me carry a rifle the 
first man I want to get in my sights is LBJ [a reference to the then President of the United 
States Lyndon B Johnson].’ Watts’s conviction for advocating violence against the President 
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was quashed – SCOTUS did not believe his statement had constituted a ‘true threat’. ‘Political 
hyperbole’ was protected by the First Amendment.63 The law on ‘true threats’ was developed 
in the later case of Virginia v. Black:64 ‘”True threats” encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression…to commit an act of unlawful violence 
to a particular individual or group of individuals…’65 A speaker therefore need not actually 
intend to carry out the threat, but they must actually intend, through a statement, to instil 
fear in the recipient.66 There is no need to prove that a recipient was actually in fear of harm.67 
And the true threats’ doctrine, unlike Brandenburg, does not contain an imminence 
component.68 Thus, this type of expression is reflective of terrorist speech on the internet,,69 
but of course one or more specified persons have to be targeted, so vague ideas about jihad 
will be excluded. 
 
There are other ways in which terror speech in the US can be limited, which do not engage 
the Brandenburg test, as the ruling of SCOTUS in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project70 
illustrates. The court ruled that a criminal prohibition on advocacy carried out in coordination 
with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization was not an unconstitutional 
infringement of freedom of speech. The offence in question was ‘providing material support 
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations’, contrary to s.2339B of Title 18 of 
the Unites States Code, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. The Humanitarian Law Project was 
therefore prevented from providing support to Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (‘PKK’), even 
though this was for non-terrorist purposes of the organisation. It wanted to advise the PKK 
on how to follow and implement humanitarian and international law and petition various 
international bodies such as the United Nations.71 The Project was also constrained from 
helping the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (‘LTTE’) to present claims for tsunami-related aid 
to international bodies and/or negotiating peace agreements between its organization and 
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the Sri Lankan government.72 Importantly, the court emphasised that support for these 
designated organisations freed up other resources within the group to be used for terror 
ends. And support gave the groups legitimacy— ‘legitimacy that makes it easier for…groups 
to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds — all of which facilitate more terrorist 
attacks.’73 On the significance of Holder for remaining true to the principles of the First 
Amendment, Barak-Erez and Scharia note: ‘The decision presumably follows the US freedom 
of speech jurisprudence…that it affirms a prohibition that abstains from addressing the 
content of the speech and focuses only on the link between the speaker and the terrorist 
organisation.’74 There are other ways in which terror speech in America may be curtailed, 
without being an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment: the offences of 
seditious conspiracy and advocating overthrow of Government, contrary to ss. 2384 and 2385 
of Title 18 of the Unites States Code, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.75 
 
It is important to note, however, that international and regional law demands that speech, 
even of a ‘dubious’ nature, should not be arbitrarily curtailed. Above, there was reference to 
UNSC Resolution 1624. This resolution does oblige states to have regard to Articles 19 of the 
UDHR and ICCPR. (Similarly, Article 12 of the CPT obliges states to respect their freedom of 
expression duties in the ICCPR and the ECHR.) Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1624, which 
condemns ‘in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts…’, references 
condemnation only in the preamble, not the later substantive obligations of the resolution. 
And, even in the later duties, the term ‘prohibit’ is only used, not ‘criminalise’.76 Indeed, the 
United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), in its global 
survey of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1624 by member states, in 2016, was keen 
to stress that the powers exercised by states should only be used for legitimate aims, that is, 
for limiting genuine terror speech, and not for illegitimate aims such as the suppression of 
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political dissent or the advocacy of controversial beliefs or views.77 Otherwise, the 
consequences could have the opposite effect of leading to greater radicalisation.78 
 
Criticising limitations to terror speech in the UK 
 
In criticising limitations to speech in the UK, is the test for assessing infringements of Article 
10(1) of the ECHR, ‘proportionality’, sufficiently demanding to protect expression, in general? 
In the case of protection of heath and morals, for example, the courts regularly defer to the 
interests of the state, as in the case of Handyside, and in the UK domestic interpretation of 
Article 10(1) – see, for example: Belfast City Council v. Miss Behavin’ Ltd.79 Indeed, is freedom 
of expression, at least in the UK, becoming much less tolerant of individuals who may cause 
others offence, meaning the bar for employing proportionality, at least domestically, is set too 
low? In a recent conviction, YouTuber, Mark Meechan, who trained his girlfriend’s dog to 
perform Nazi salutes, was fined £800 after posting videos of the dog online, in breach of s.127 
of the Communications Act 2003. The case provoked widespread concern from comedians 
and free speech campaigners including the human rights organisation, Index on Censorship. 
Index said that freedom of expression included the right to offend: ‘Defending everyone’s 
right to free speech must include defending the rights of those who say things we find 
shocking or offensive…Otherwise the freedom is meaningless.’80 
 
Where the infringement of Article 10(1) is attributed to terror speech, in particular, the courts 
interpret the proportionality test much more in favour of the state at the expense of the 
individual: Leroy v. France.81 (For the purposes of domestic implementation of the ECHR, the 
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UK courts must have regard to the case law of the ECtHR, as per s.2 of the HRA.) In Leroy a 
cartoon was published in the Basque weekly Ekaitza, two days after the 9/11 attacks in New 
York and Washington in September 2001. The cartoon was a caricature representing the 
attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center, with a caption stating: ‘We have all 
dreamt of it…Hamas did it.’ Leroy was convicted under French law for complicity in condoning 
terrorism – the ECtHR found this to be a proportionate interference with Article 10(1). The 
cartoon not only glorified the terror attacks, but the date of publication, so close to 9/11, was 
significant. And the effect of the cartoon in a politically sensitive region such as the Basque 
Country was significant, too, as was Leroy’s fine in the French courts, 1500 Euros, which was 
modest.82 
 
However, compare the punishment in Leroy with that of the Muhammad Hamza Siddiq, in the 
UK. Siddiq was recently jailed for four and half years for using social media to encourage 
others to commit terrorism. He made a post on his Facebook timeline in which he referred to 
the struggle of jihad as an obligation that ‘is not limited to defensive operations’. The post 
was liked 67 times and led to an investigation by the police. The officer in charge of the 
investigation said: ‘The Facebook post made by Hamza Siddiq was published just months after 
many people, young and old, lost their lives in UK terror attacks in both London and 
Manchester. The statement was inflammatory and inciting.’83 Agreeing with the conviction of 
Muhammad Hamza Siddiq is not difficult, especially as it was an apparent direct 
encouragement of terrorism, unlike an indirect – condonation – of terrorism in Leroy. But was 
the length of the sentence, four and a half years, not excessive, especially when it was: 
months after the UK terror attacks, not days after 9/11 in Leroy; posted on Facebook, which 
was only liked 67 times, not published in a weekly newspaper in the politically sensitive 
Basque country; and a significant jail-term, not a fine? In domestic law, the British courts must 
have regard to the case law of the ECtHR, as per s.2 of the HRA. But the clear disparity in 
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outcomes between the two cases suggests that the application of proportionality review, for 
the purposes of assessing breaches of Article 10, at least in the UK, is insufficient to protect 
expression that allegedly incites violence of a terrorist nature. 
 
Next, criticisms of the specific UK offence of encouragement of terrorism, as per s.1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006, are considered. In 2008, for example, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), in considering the UK’s observance of its responsibilities under the ICCPR, 
was particularly concerned about the effect the offence of encouragement of terrorism had 
on freedom of expression in general. This was because s.1 was defined in ‘broad and vague 
terms’.84 There is a worry, therefore, that the broad and vague nature of the offence will even 
inhibit speech unconnected to terrorism. Hunt states: ‘There are concerns that broadcasters, 
internet service providers, as well as organisations and individuals representing particular 
categories of legitimate political opinion, may engage in all manner of self-censorship.’85 
Indeed, more worryingly, rather than countering terrorism, do the measures increase the 
likelihood of extremism and political violence, which is a previous concern expressed by the 
UNCTED in states’ implementation of UNSC Resolution 1624? According to Human Rights 
Watch, for example, there is a danger that the very communities whose support is needed in 
the fight against terrorism will be alienated.86 
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In specific terms, dismay can be expressed about encouraging an act of terrorism, since an act 
of terrorism in the UK is not in itself an offence. So it outlaws conduct, albeit in statements, 
that is not, strictly speaking, an offence known to law.87 The wide definition of terrorism in 
the UK, as per s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, is also problematic. When the Terrorism Bill 2005 
was being debated in the UK’s Legislature, the Houses of Parliament, Human Rights Watch 
noted this as a cause for concern.88 Broadly, the definition of terrorism in the UK involves 
serious violence against either people or property, in advancing either a racial, religious, 
political or ideological objective, for the purposes of either intimidating the public or 
influencing the government or a foreign government. Indeed, in 2013, in Regina v. Gul89 the 
UK’s Supreme Court said: ‘While acknowledging that the issue is ultimately one for 
Parliament, we should record our view that the concerns and suggestions about the width of 
the statutory definition [of terrorism]…merit serious consideration.’90  
 
Attacking the UK definition of terrorism, Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned with 
the term ‘influence’; for them, it is too low a threshold for targeting the state.91 According to 
a previous Independent Reviewer on Anti-Terror Legislation in the UK, David Anderson QC, 
‘influence’ draws the definition so broadly that it can mean political journalists and bloggers 
are subject to the full range of anti-terrorism powers, if they threaten to publish, prepare to 
publish something that the authorities think may be dangerous to life, public health or public 
safety. With ‘influence’ the UK definition is so broad it could even catch a campaigner who 
voices religious objections to a vaccination campaign on the grounds that they are a danger 
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to public health.92 Similar concerns were also expressed by the UN HRC, in 2015, in that year’s 
report on the UK’s compliance with the ICCPR.93 
 
Section 1(5) of the Terrorism Act 2006 says that it is irrelevant (a) whether anything mentioned 
in those subsections relates to the commission, preparation or instigation of one or more 
particular acts of terrorism or of acts of terrorism generally. David Anderson QC is concerned 
it is unnecessary to show that specific acts of terrorism are being encouraged.94 Under the 
CPT it will also be recalled that an incitement should only be unlawful where it ‘causes a 
danger’ that a terrorist act might be committed. There must therefore be a causal link 
between a hateful statement and the act that is to be prevented. S.1(5) of the Terrorism Act 
2006 exceeds this: it says that it is irrelevant whether any person is in fact encouraged or 
induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate any such act or offence. Causality 
is further attenuated in that ‘members of the public’ can include anyone in the world.95 On 
this latter issue Jones and others further note:  
 
‘It is not clear how a court…is to identify ‘the member of the public’…The larger the 
class of person who may read or hear the statement, the more obvious are the 
problems…The larger, and more diverse, the ‘members of the public’ may be, the 
more difficult will be the evidential proving that…members of the public may be 
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susceptible to such statements so as to consider them as an inducements to the 
commission of acts of terrorism.’96 
 
Section 1(1) also says: ‘some…members of the public.’ In addition to the evidential problems 
concerned with the meaning of ‘public’, how many people actually constitute ‘some’?97 
 
Concern has been expressed about the mental element ingrained within s.1, too. In 
implementing its CoE obligations, the UK also went further than it was required to do so in 
the CPT. It will be recalled that Article 5 defines a public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence as intentionally inciting the commission of a terrorism offence. Section 1 does 
expressly reference the intentional encouragement of terrorism, but, unlike the CPT, it 
permits the offence to be conducted recklessly. In 2005 when the then Terrorism Bill was 
progressing through Parliament, alarm was expressed that a person could encourage 
terrorism without realising it.98 
 
As per s.1, terrorism can be indirectly encouraged, of which glorification, whether in the past, 
present or future, is a feature. This has drawn particular criticism for being too wide and 
unclear. Certainty in the law is a key criterion of human rights norms. Article 7 of the ECHR is 
‘no punishment without law’. This clearly references the Rule of Law but has been widely 
interpreted as also requiring legal clarity.99 In addition, in curtailing Article 10(1) of the ECHR, 
states cannot do so without relying on limitations that are ‘prescribed by law’, as per Article 
10(2). For this reason, when the Terrorism Bill 2005 was being debated, the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) called for the removal of references to glorification, 
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for violating this element of Article 10(2).100 Finally, unlike the offence in s.1 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006, there is no universal jurisdiction for offences violating the CPT, as per Article 14. 
 
A (greater?) balancing freedom of speech with national security in the USA 
 
The offence of encouragement of terrorism in the UK, as per s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, is 
a disproportionate interference with free expression. But, conversely, does America’s 
protection of free speech, in the First Amendment, insufficiently attach weight to the rights 
and freedoms of others, especially the potential victims of terror incitement? There are ways 
of limiting terror speech in the US, without engaging the First Amendment, such as providing 
material support to a designated terror organisation, as per the ruling of SCOTUS in Holder. 
Indeed, free speech can be curtailed more directly, as the ‘true threats’ doctrine illustrates, 
though the law on this is still developing, and is confined, at least currently, to a specified 
victims or victims. Thus, in the age of the internet the United States could do more to limit 
this classification of free speech, as Guiora observes: ‘The 1969 ruling [in Brandenburg] came 
well before the digital age. We live in a time where clicks and shares spread hate and false 
information instantaneously across the Internet.’101 European human rights law clearly does 
not apply to America. But the values behind Articles 1, 2, 3 and 17 of the ECHR, for example, 
warrant serious consideration.  
 
Article 1 of the ECHR obliges states to secure rights on all citizens. What about the equal 
security of the rights of terror victims? Specifically, Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, the right to 
life and freedom from torture respectively, impose a substantive duty on the state to prevent 
violations of the rights by non-state actors, which in this case would be terror suspects 
(though this is not an absolute obligation): see, for example, Osman v. United Kingdom.102 
Article 17 of the ECHR, prohibition of abuse of rights, is particularly interesting. The general 
purpose of Article 17 is to prevent individuals or groups with totalitarian aims from exploiting 
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in their own interests the principles enunciated by the ECHR. In Norwood v. United 
Kingdom,103 for example, the applicant was a member of the British National Party, an 
extreme right-wing political party. Between November 2001 and January 2002, the applicant 
displayed in the window of his first-floor flat a large poster. The poster depicted New York’s 
Twin Towers in flames after 9/11, accompanied by the words ‘Islam out of Britain – Protect 
the British People’. Following a complaint from a member of the public, the police removed 
the poster. Despite contacting Norwood and inviting him to attend an interview, Norwood 
refused to attend. He was therefore prosecuted. Norwood challenged his subsequent 
conviction on the grounds of it being a disproportionate interference with Article 10(1) of the 
ECHR. The ECtHR dismissed his application. To equate the whole of Islam with the 9/11 attacks 
was in fact an abuse of Article 10, as per Article 17; it denied the rights of others and ignored 
the fundamental values of the ECHR such as tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.104  
The ECtHR upheld a domestic conviction in a similar case, Ivanov v. Russia,105 on the same 
grounds, Article 17, where the applicant had expressed hatred against Jews rather than 
Muslims. (Holocaust denial does not qualify for Article 10 protection either: Garaudy v. 
France.106) If the ideas which Article 17 of the ECHR represent were a factor in determining 
breaches of the First Amendment of the US Constitution, surely Brandenburg’s conviction 
would be upheld? 
  
Linked to the Article 17 argument, to afford less protection in America to content inciting 
terror violence, is the ‘suicide pact’ argument – a homage to the dissenting judgment of 
Justice Robert Jackson, in SCOTUS, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago.107 In Terminiello the City 
of Chicago had sought to criminalise speech that provoked public disorder. Arthur Terminiello 
was giving a speech to the Christian Veterans of America in which he criticized various racial 
and religious groups such as Jews and made a number of inflammatory, pro-fascist comments. 
There was a crowd of approximately 1,000 people outside, protesting the speech, some 
violently. The Supreme Court held that Terminiello’s conviction for disorderly conduct was 
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unconstitutional. But Justice Jackson believed that the majority had attached far too much 
weight to Terminiello’s free speech, failing to appreciate the very real concerns of public 
safety, with two opposing groups, pockets of which were intent on committing violence 
against other. His dissent in this case is most famous for its final paragraph:  
 
‘This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that…all local attempts to 
maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. The choice is not between 
order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is 
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical 
wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.’108 
 
The phrase ‘suicide pact’ is often associated with the former President of the United States, 
Abraham Lincoln, too. Lincoln suspended the constitutional right of habeus corpus during the 
American Civil War, in 1861. According to Section 9, clause 2, of Article I, of the US 
Constitution, ‘The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 
in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.’ Was the American Civil War 
a ‘rebellion’? More importantly, however, Article I of the US Constitution references the 
powers of the Legislature – Congress – not the Executive – the President. But Congress was 
not in session.109 Lincoln claimed the violation of a constitutional right to save the constitution 
so, to him, he was not acting against the constitution: he was preserving it.110 Conceptually, 
one may found the actions of Lincoln during the Civil War, and the ‘suicide pact’ argument of 
Justice Robert Jackson in Terminiello, on the state theory of the German constitutional 
theorist, Carl Schmitt, in his book Dictatorship, published in 1921.111 Here Schmitt supported 
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the conferring of wide powers on the then German President to protect the state, at the time, 
from extreme groups seeking to destroy it. Schmitt based the President’s powers on 
emergency provisions within Article 48 of the German constitution, 1919.112 This form of 
constitutional protection was premised on a ‘commissarial dictatorship’, in that a 
commissioner dictator was appointed by the sovereign, whose aim was to ‘eliminate the 
danger and to strengthen the foundation which had been threatened’.113  
 
In his later work, Political Theology, dating from 1922, Schmitt determined that the 
sovereign’s commissarial dictator could only be appointed, and the wide powers conferred 
on them to address the crisis, when it was a state of exception. A state of exception was 
characterized by a situation of extreme peril and a danger to the existence of the state.114 In 
his later works eg Legality and Legitimacy, published in 1932, Schmitt continued to believe 
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that liberalism was ill-equipped to protect the state from extremist groups seeking to destroy 
it. For Schmitt, liberalism’s neutrality and tolerance exacerbated the potential for chaos. 
Extremist groups then abused this neutrality and tolerance for their own political gain.115 Of 
course the author here is not likening the existing terror threat, post 9/11, to the Schmittian 
exception, but merely to illustrate that too much respect for hate speech is counter-
productive, since extremists do not reciprocate liberal, constitutional ideals of tolerance, 
social peace and non-discrimination. 
 
In the age of terrorism post 9/11, therefore, together with the speed, ease and little cost 
incurred in sharing terror speech in the internet, should there not be a reappraisal of, for 
example, the Brandenburg ruling? The author is based in the UK. But the UK’s approach to 
limiting terror speech is arguably too intrusive of freedom of expression. Therefore a 
compromise approach, a ‘third way’, between the two jurisdictions is suggested in the 
following section, though a common definition for both countries, in full, is not proposed. 
 
A ‘third way’ for limiting terror speech in the UK and USA 
 
First, a possible solution to narrowing the reach of terror speech in the UK, for example, would 
be to revisit the wide definition of terrorism, within s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The term 
‘influence’ the government is particularly contentious, as stated above. But in the later case 
of Regina (Miranda) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,116 in the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales, Lord Dyson said: 
 
‘Terrorism as it is ordinarily understood is the attempt to advance some political or 
religious cause not by persuasion but by violence, the endangerment of life etc. To 
describe a newspaper writing political stories that inadvertently reveal the identity of 
members of the intelligence service or oppose government policy on vaccination as 
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committing an act of terrorism is to use the word terrorism in a way that bears no 
relationship to any ordinary understanding of the concept.’117 
 
So, for the purposes of influencing the government, since Miranda there has to be some 
mental element such as intention, or at least recklessness, to commit an act of terrorism. The  
Court of Appeal clearly narrowed the reach of the definition by requiring some form of mens 
rea on the part of a criminal suspect, through statutory interpretation, but it had no power to 
literally change the Legislature’s conscious use of the word ‘influence’. For comparison, at the 
international level, the United Nations’ Draft Comprehensive Convention Against 
International Terrorism, 2002, defines terrorism, in Article 2(1), as including ‘to compel [my 
italics] a Government or an international organization.’ ‘Compel’ is of course a higher 
standard than ‘influence’. This UN Convention is yet to be agreed, but the same words, 
‘compel’ a Government, have been adopted by the UNSC, for example, in its Resolution 1566 
of 2004. Indeed, the European Union even adopts a higher standard than compel: ‘unduly 
compel’, in Article 3(2)(b) of its Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism.118 Paying 
particular attention, therefore, to the breadth of the UK’s definition of terrorism is certainly 
one way of limiting the effect the offence of encouragement of terrorism has on freedom of 
expression.  
 
The ruling of the Court of Appeal in Miranda imposed a mental element within the definition 
of terrorism in the UK, but concern about the mental element for the substantive offence of 
encouragement of terrorism still remains. It will be recalled that the CPT suggests only a 
standard of intention, so the reference to recklessness in s.1 should be removed; indeed, 
advocating violence in America, as per Brandenburg, requires intention. Miranda is not the 
only ‘reform’ to the reach of the offence of encouragement of terrorism, since its inception in 
2006: recently, the UK enacted a new piece of relevant legislation, the Counter-Terrorism and 
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Border Security Act 2019. Section 5 amends s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006: ‘Some…members 
of the public’ is replaced by ‘a reasonable person’.  
 
The concerns previously expressed about the reach of the term ‘public’, and the exact number 
of people required to constitute ‘some’, has apparently been addressed by s.5 of Counter-
Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. This to be welcomed. But, in addition to the issue of 
recklessness, the exclusion of proof that a crime could actually be committed remains. Under 
the CPT it will also be recalled that an incitement should only be unlawful where it ‘causes a 
danger’ that a terrorist act might be committed. There should therefore be some causal link 
between a hateful statement and the act that is to be prevented, in s.1 of the Terrorism Act 
2006. This is another issue, after the requirement of intention, where the UK and USA 
offences could conceivably overlap. In America the requirement that the speech likely incites 
or produces imminent lawless action, as per Brandenburg, should be relaxed: the CPT only 
references a danger that such an offence may be committed. (‘True threats’ do not carry an 
element of imminence but of course have their own limitations, such as a specified victim or 
victims.) If so, this could represent something of a return to a ‘clear and present danger’ type 
of test adopted by SCOTUS in, for example, Schenck in 1919.119 A final way of negotiating the 
limits to free speech in the UK and America could be to tighten the proportionality test by 
employing some elements of strict scrutiny and/or loosening the strict scrutiny test by 
employing some elements of proportionality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Following the recent terror shooting in Christchurch, the British Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, 
said that online platforms had a responsibility not to do the terrorists’ work for them: ‘This 
terrorist filmed his shooting with the intention of spreading his ideology…Allowing terrorists 
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to glorify in the bloodshed or spread more extremist views can only lead to more 
radicalisation and murders.’120 This is a legitimate argument. The spectacular rise of Islamist 
terrorism after 9/11, with the enduring threat Islamism poses, justify curtailments of terror 
speech, especially online. Indeed, the recent terror attack in Christchurch cannot be blamed 
on Islamism: the terrorist was a Neo-Nazi. In the UK and elsewhere the rise of Far-Right 
political violence is of particular concern.121  But existing provisions in the UK to prevent terror 
speech, and the sharing of it, online are surely sufficient? If anything they go too far. The 
offence of encouragement of terrorism, as per s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, is a 
disproportionate interference with freedom of expression. This is despite recent limitations 
on the scope of the crime by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Miranda and the 
enactment of s.5 of Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. The definition of 
terrorism in the UK, including the term ‘influence’, as per s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, is too 
wide; the offence can be committed recklessly, as well as intentionally; and there is no need 
to show a real risk that someone may be encouraged by the speech. These issues need 
addressing.  
 
Comparatively, limitations on terror speech in America can only be committed intentionally, 
as per the rulings of SCOTUS in Brandenburg (though for ‘true threats’ there is only an 
intention to state something that puts a person a fear, not to intend that a person is actually 
put in fear). But the respect for free speech in this instance, because of the demands of the 
First Amendment, date from, in the case of Brandenburg, 1969. This is obviously unreflective 
of the internet age, in the 21st Century. European human rights law, arising from Articles 2 
and 3 of the ECHR, imposes positive obligations on states to prevent violations of death and 
serious harm from third parties such as terrorists (though these are not unqualified duties). 
The recent terror attacks at churches in Sri Lanka, in April 2019, in retaliation for the 
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Christchurch shootings, could have been avoided if the Sri Lankan authorities had acted on 
intelligence passed on to them from foreign governments.122 This is a human rights violation 
by Sri Lanka, although it was not the perpetrator of the attack. SCOTUS has upheld indirect 
restrictions on terror speech in Holder, but a reflection of these other values, from within 
European human rights law, could entail a reconsideration of the American requirement of 
imminent lawful action; a danger that harm might be committed should be sufficient, 
mirroring, to some degree, the old test of ‘clear and present danger’ in Schenck. 
 
Some academics in America are strongly resistant to reappraising the doctrine from 
Brandenburg, even in the context of limiting terror speech. For them this will ‘easily send us 
skidding down a quite slippery slope’.123 There is also legitimate question whether genuine 
attempts by states to honour their international and regional responsibilities to limit the 
advocation of terrorist violence are, in practice, effective. Terrorists intent on sharing 
information can do so privately through encrypted messaging services such as WhatsApp and 
Telegram.124 And the perpetrator of the recent postal attacks in the USA, in October 2018, 
used the dark web for information – 16 packages containing pipe bombs were sent to several 
prominent critics of US President Donald Trump.125 So, whilst the restrictions proposed here 
may not stop hardline ideologists, or even those on the cusp of extremism and violence, 
effective counter-strategy involves ‘preventing’ individuals from being radicalised. Content-
based restrictions challenge traditional liberal constitutional ideals of tolerance, but tolerance 
only goes so far before, as the German constitutionalist theorist Carl Schmitt predicted, it 
becomes self-defeating and injurious to society. 
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